HP (Hewlett-Packard) 2610 Switch User Manual


 
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Enhancements
Release R.11.12 Enhancements
Ceasing untrusted relay information logs for <duration>. More than one DHCP client packet
received on an untrusted port with a relay information field was dropped. To avoid filling the log file
with repeated attempts, untrusted relay information packets will not be logged for the specified
<duration>.
Client address <mac-address> not equal to source MAC <mac-address> detected on port
<port-number>. Indicates that a client packet source MAC address does not match the “chaddr”
field. This event is recognized when the dhcp-snooping agent is enabled to filter DHCP client packets
that do not have a matching “chaddr” field and source MAC address.
Ceasing MAC mismatch logs for <duration>. More than one DHCP client packet with a
mismatched source MAC and chaddr field was dropped. To avoid filling the log file with repeated
attempts, client address mismatch events will not be logged for the specified <duration>.
Attempt to release address <ip-address> leased to port <port-number> detected on port
<port-number> dropped. Indicates an attempt by a client to release an address when a DHCPRE-
LEASE or DHCPDECLINE packet is received on a port different from the port the address was leased
to.
Ceasing bad release logs for %s. More than one bad DHCP client release packet was dropped.
To avoid filling the log file with repeated bad release dropped packets, bad releases will not be logged
for <duration>.
Lease table is full, DHCP lease was not added. The lease table is full and this lease will not be
added to it.
Write database to remote file failed errno (error-num). An error occurred while writing the
temporary file and sending it using tftp to the remote server.
DHCP packets being rate-limited. Too many DHCP packets are flowing through the switch and
some are being dropped.
Snooping table is full. The DHCP binding table is full and subsequent bindings are being dropped.
Enhancement (PR_1000451356) — Dynamic ARP Protection (DARPP) protects your
network from ARP cache poisoning by dropping packets, with an invalid IP-to-MAC address
binding, that are received on untrusted ports. For more information, see “Dynamic ARP
Protection” on page 28.